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Security Centre

Physical Attack Preparedness

Physical coercion is not the everyday risk for most Bitcoin holders, but it is real enough to plan for.

Recent attacks in France and elsewhere have reminded many Bitcoin holders that digital wealth can create offline security risks when identity, location, routines, or perceived holdings become visible.

This guide is not intended to create fear. It exists so you can prepare calmly: reduce what you disclose, control who can reach you, and make sure meaningful Bitcoin cannot be moved by one person under pressure.

Collaborative security changes the theft model. Your own key alone cannot spend from a 2-of-3 vault. That reduces what an attacker can take from the vault. It does not guarantee your physical safety, and it does not mean every possible signing path is frozen.

Reduce exposure first. Then make meaningful Bitcoin hard to move under pressure. The two work together.

Uncommon for most holders Collaborative security protection Calm preparation

Still rare for ordinary holders, but real enough that serious Bitcoin holders should plan for it calmly. The purpose of this guide is preparation, not fear. Know the plan, then live normally.

For concerned clients: the right response is not panic. The right response is to review privacy, make sure your family understands that funds cannot move by one person, and confirm that your collaborative security setup and signing policy are current.

Why This Matters Now

Wrench attacks are not theoretical. France has recently seen a visible cluster of crypto-related kidnappings, extortion attempts, and attacks on families connected to digital-asset wealth. These incidents have understandably increased concern among Bitcoin holders.

The lesson is not that Bitcoin self-custody is too dangerous. The lesson is that serious Bitcoin custody must include offline security: privacy, discretion, separated signers, clear signing policy, and a structure that cannot be moved by one person under pressure.

Physical coercion is not the everyday risk for most Bitcoin holders. But recent attacks in France and elsewhere show why meaningful Bitcoin should not depend on one person, one device, one home, or one moment of pressure.

The most important protection is structural. Do not make meaningful Bitcoin dependent on one device, one person, one home, one cloud account, or one moment of stress.

The Three Highest-Impact Principles

These three principles reduce how attractive and reachable a target you are, and how much one person under pressure can move:

1. Reduce Who Knows, And What They Know

Privacy is the first layer of physical security. Most physical attacks begin because someone believes a target holds meaningful Bitcoin and knows where to find them.

  • Do not discuss balances publicly.
  • Do not post screenshots, wallet interfaces, vault names, or transaction activity.
  • Limit who knows your setup, locations, devices, and routines.
  • Use need-to-know disclosure with family, advisers, accountants, and legal professionals.

This is about discretion, not paranoia. Serious wealth has always required privacy.

Also control who can initiate contact. An incoming call or message is not proof of identity. Prefer verify-and-initiate over answer-and-assess. See Take Control of Who Can Reach You below.

2. Your Safety Always Comes First

If you ever found yourself in a threatening situation:

  • Do not resist
  • Do not escalate
  • Prioritise yourself and your family, not your Bitcoin

Collaborative security exists so you can comply calmly while remaining safe.

3. Your Single Key Cannot Move Your Vault

Your main Bitcoin is secured in a 2-of-3 multisig vault:

  • You hold one key
  • The Bitcoin Adviser holds one key
  • Our custody partner holds one key

Two keys are required to move funds from the vault. Your individual seed or device cannot spend alone. That materially reduces what physical coercion can achieve against meaningful Bitcoin. It does not guarantee your safety.

Creating Accounts

Account signup is where many people hand over more identity than a service needs. Prefer lean accounts and strong authentication.

Checklist

  1. Use a dedicated email alias where the service allows it, especially for shopping and hardware vendors.
  2. Unique passwords in a password manager; enable phishing-resistant authentication (security keys where available).
  3. Skip optional fields that are not required to use the service.
  4. Limit third-party sign-in (“Sign in with…”) that links unrelated services together.
  5. Know when identity checks are legitimate. Do not invent false details where accurate information is legally or operationally required. Privacy is risk reduction, not a licence to bypass KYC or similar rules.

Related: 2FA guide, YubiKey guide, password manager guide.

Buying and Receiving Hardware

When you buy a signing device, authenticity comes before privacy. A tampered device is worse than a retailer holding a delivery address.

Checklist

  1. Buy from the manufacturer only. Avoid resellers, marketplaces, and untrusted second-hand devices.
  2. Keep the order lean. Share what is required to fulfil the order or meet legal requirements; leave optional fields blank.
  3. Consider collection or alternative delivery where the merchant supports it. Parcel lockers and workplaces can reduce home exposure; they do not guarantee privacy.
  4. Remember who retains records. Retailers, carriers, and payment processors may keep contact and delivery data. A breach can link that data to ownership of Bitcoin hardware.
  5. Never trade authenticity for anonymity. Hiding a home address is not worth an untrusted device.

More detail: Purchasing a signing device.

Paying Without Exposing Holdings

Bitcoin payments are not inherently anonymous. On-chain activity can reveal relationships between addresses. Spending directly from a substantial long-term vault can create avoidable privacy problems.

Checklist

  1. Do not assume Bitcoin is private. Observers may link payments, change outputs, and reuse patterns over time.
  2. Avoid spending from a long-term vault for ordinary purchases. Prefer a separate spending balance when you need to pay.
  3. Compare methods without a universal winner. Card leaves merchant and bank records. Cash leaves less digital trail but has its own practical limits. Bitcoin can be private or revealing depending on how you use it.
  4. Retail and travel purchases are often better settled with ordinary means than by advertising a large on-chain balance.

Privacy is a trade-off, not a guarantee. Choosing a payment method to reduce one exposure can increase another. Decide case by case.

Assessing Your AI-Era Exposure

Attackers and curious strangers can correlate breach records, professional profiles, property information, conference lists, and social activity. AI tools make that correlation faster. You do not need a wallet compromise for someone to build a convincing picture of who you are and where you live.

Checklist

  1. Search your own name and aliases in major search engines and common data-broker style results. Note what a stranger could learn in ten minutes.
  2. Reduce unnecessary public signals. Holdings, balances, vault screenshots, travel plans, and home routines do not belong on public feeds.
  3. Treat past vendor and exchange records as sticky. You cannot erase every database, but you can stop adding fresh exposure.
  4. Be careful with unfamiliar AI services. Do not paste seed phrases, vault details, full identity documents, or precise home routines into tools you do not trust.
  5. Assume personalised messages can be fake. Real names, order numbers, or addresses in an email do not prove the sender is legitimate. See communications security below.

Take Control of Who Can Reach You

Your phone is for people you know and calls you choose to make. An incoming call is not proof of identity, authority or legitimacy.

The old assumption was that a telephone call was a legitimate way for an organisation to reach you. That assumption creates an unnecessary attack surface. Prefer verify and initiate over answer and assess.

Recent hardware-wallet phishing incidents show the pattern: messages that look official, sometimes containing real customer details, while devices and funds remain unaffected. Criminals do not need to move Bitcoin to undermine your sense of security. Credible personal information is enough to build a pretext. Australian Scamwatch guidance also stresses caller-ID spoofing and screening unknown callers.

Default channel policy

  • Outbound calls: initiate using independently verified numbers from an official site or statement you already trust.
  • Incoming known contacts: accept, but verify unusual or sensitive requests. Caller ID can be spoofed, including numbers already in your address book.
  • Incoming unknown numbers: silence or screen; do not engage directly. Voicemail and a trusted callback are enough for most cases.
  • Claimed Google, bank, AFP, manufacturer, or tech support: hang up and contact the organisation through a channel you verified yourself.
  • Unsolicited SMS and email: treat as unverified even when they include your name, order number, or address.
  • Financial or Bitcoin-related requests: never act solely on an inbound communication.

Checklist

  1. Silence or screen unknown numbers as a sensible default if you prioritise privacy.
  2. Keep exceptions for expected calls (hospital, school, delivery you initiated) without restoring unrestricted access.
  3. Never disclose recovery phrases, grant remote device access, or approve financial transactions because someone contacted you first.
  4. If urgency is the main argument, slow down. Legitimate organisations can wait for a verified callback.

Related: Bitcoin Scam Protection Guide and Security Centre: scam protection.

Silencing unknown calls is a practical default, not a universal rule. Choose the level of screening that fits your life. The principle is the same: you control when organisations reach you.

Personal Safety Automations

Optional tools can help trusted people notice if something is wrong. They are assistance, not an emergency-response guarantee. Internet outages, locked phones, revoked permissions, and service failures can stop them working.

Bounded patterns

  • Check-in reminders you control, with a trusted contact who knows what to do if you miss one.
  • Trusted-contact notifications that share only what you agreed in advance.
  • Time-limited location sharing for travel or short windows — not permanent broadcasting of your routine.

Hard limits. Do not automate vault details, transaction initiation, or a false duress signal. Do not wire personal-safety automation into Canary or vault signing. Test any arrangement, get informed consent from contacts, and accept false alarms and reliability limits.

How Collaborative Security Reduces Coercion Risk

Collaborative security reduces what physical coercion can achieve against the vault. Separate technical limits, TBA’s operational controls, and the reality of human safety:

Three layers of protection

  • Technical: In a client-controlled 2-of-3 vault, one client key cannot spend alone. Two keys are required for a valid Bitcoin signature.
  • Operational: TBA can refuse a co-signature when coercion or distress is suspected. Unusual urgency triggers verification. A phone call or email cannot simply override those checks.
  • Human safety: An attacker may remain dangerous whether or not a transaction is possible. Collaborative security does not guarantee physical safety.

Initiation is not the same as signature thresholds. Any two keys can satisfy the Bitcoin signing requirement. Starting a spend through the normal vault platform belongs to the client. Do not treat that as an unconditional freeze of every alternative arrangement.

Additional Protection: The Duress & Capacity Clause

Our Terms of Service strengthen the operational layer. TBA will disregard instructions that appear coerced or involuntary.

This means:

  • Even if someone forces you to request a signature
  • Even if you attempt to act “willingly” under pressure
  • We will not process a request that appears to be made under duress

This policy exists to protect you, much like a bank rejecting a suspicious transfer. We are trained to recognise signs of coercion and may refuse to co-sign when something looks wrong. That is an operational control, not a promise that every possible path is technically frozen, and not a promise about what an attacker will do.

Pressure should make vault spending harder, not easier. That reduces the value of coercion against the Bitcoin. It does not mean attackers always stop, and it does not replace personal safety.

During a Coercion Attempt

This remains uncommon for most holders, but preparation matters. If you ever need simple, calm language, here is your script:

What to Say

Use this simple, calm language:

"My main Bitcoin is protected by a collaborative security arrangement. I cannot move it myself. Transactions require an additional independent signature and must pass security checks that cannot simply be bypassed on demand."

Reinforce that:

  • You do not have sole control of the vault
  • A normal spend cannot be rushed past verification
  • TBA can refuse to co-sign when something looks wrong

Personal safety comes first. Collaborative security reduces what can be taken from the vault. It does not guarantee that an attacker will stop, and it does not guarantee your physical safety.

Emotional coercion parallels: The same mindset helps against social engineering scams. Scammers use urgency, isolation, and fear. If someone is pressuring you to send Bitcoin quickly over a call or message, treat it as unverified. See our Bitcoin Scam Protection Guide and Take Control of Who Can Reach You.

How to Act

A. Stay calm and comply if necessary

This is about personal safety, not protecting Bitcoin. Collaborative security limits what one key can move. Your safety still comes first.

B. Clearly explain your limitations

Short, simple statements work best:

  • "I cannot move the main Bitcoin myself."
  • "They can refuse to sign if anything looks unusual."

C. If they demand your device or seed

If giving it over reduces danger, you may do so safely. Your key alone cannot move the vault. Afterward, TBA will treat the key as compromised and assist with recovery.

What Not to Promise: Do not say you can send everything immediately. You cannot spend the vault alone through the normal arrangement. Rely on the truth: "The whole point of using this system is that I cannot move it myself." That may reduce the incentive to continue a financial demand. It is not a guarantee about the attacker's next move.

After an Incident

If anything ever occurs, follow these steps once you are safe:

Immediate Actions

  1. Contact The Bitcoin Adviser via your secure channel. We will reject suspicious signing requests, treat exposed material as compromised, and help rebuild your vault.
  2. Treat exposed devices as compromised. We will help you reset everything safely.
  3. File a police report if appropriate. Standard procedure in any security event.

Knowing these steps in advance brings peace of mind, even though most holders will never need them.

For detailed recovery procedures: See our Bitcoin Emergency Kit for comprehensive guidance on what to do after security incidents, including lost keys, compromised devices, and recovery procedures.

Decoy Wallets: Useful In Narrow Cases, Dangerous If Misunderstood

Some holders keep a small, separate wallet with limited funds as a personal-safety measure under extreme duress. This is optional, advanced, and not part of most clients' core security model.

Decoy strategies can backfire. Attackers may escalate when they believe more funds exist, or when a decoy amount is too small to satisfy them. Deception is unreliable and must never replace structural controls.

Decoys are least reliable against targeted criminals who believe they already know the victim has more meaningful holdings. In that scenario, the better protection is not deception; it is making the main vault impossible to move alone.

The safest Bitcoin is Bitcoin you cannot be forced to move alone. Collaborative security, multisig, and clear signing policy are the primary defences against physical coercion.

How TBA Thinks About Decoy Wallets

  • Do not become a target: privacy, discretion, and avoiding public displays of wealth reduce risk before any wallet strategy matters.
  • Do not be able to move meaningful Bitcoin alone: collaborative security, multisig, and co-signing policy mean one person under pressure cannot drain the vault.
  • Process controls: TBA will not co-sign if coercion is suspected, under the Duress & Capacity clause.
  • Optional decoy wallet: a personal-safety pressure valve only, not a vault strategy or inheritance plan.
  • Avoid inheritance-breaking complexity: passphrases, hidden wallets, and duress PINs can create recovery failures for heirs.

A decoy wallet may be one small part of a personal-safety plan, but it is unreliable. The more robust strategy is making meaningful Bitcoin impossible to move by one person under pressure.

A Better Physical Security Model

  • Spending wallet: keep day-to-day amounts separate from core vault holdings.
  • Collaborative security: meaningful Bitcoin requires multiple independent approvals to move.
  • Separated signers: no single device, seed, or person holds enough authority alone.
  • Signing policy: unusual urgency, distress, or coercion triggers verification and refusal.
  • Family message: heirs and trusted contacts know the vault cannot be moved by one person under pressure.

Passphrases and hidden wallets are advanced. They can protect against some threats but often break inheritance and recovery workflows. If heirs cannot reconstruct access after an incident, the security model has failed. Document any advanced setup with your adviser and estate plan.

Some hardware wallets support duress PINs or device-specific duress features. Treat these as narrow, optional tools. They do not replace collaborative security, and they add operational complexity. Discuss any duress feature with your adviser before enabling it.

Data Exposure Changes The Risk

Physical attacks usually do not begin with cryptography. They begin with information: names, addresses, routines, public posts, leaked customer records, exchange data, tax records, or social signals that suggest someone may hold meaningful Bitcoin.

You cannot control every database that has ever stored your information. But you can reduce what is visible, avoid broadcasting wealth, separate your home life from your Bitcoin setup, and make sure no single device or seed phrase can move meaningful funds.

What This Means In Practice

  • Reduce public signals: avoid posting holdings, balances, screenshots, wallets, vault names, or travel routines.
  • Assume old data may exist: past exchange, tax, mailing, conference, or vendor records may have created exposure.
  • Use collaborative security: meaningful Bitcoin should require multiple independent approvals.
  • Separate locations: do not keep all devices, backups, and instructions in one place.
  • Prepare your family message: everyone should understand that the main vault cannot be moved by one person.

For a practical checklist on searching your own footprint and the way AI can amplify public records, see Assessing Your AI-Era Exposure.

Home & Privacy Hygiene

No need for extreme measures. Just sensible discretion:

Physical Security

  • Don't label anything "Bitcoin"
  • Don't leave hardware wallets lying around
  • Keep backups stored discreetly

Digital Privacy

  • Avoid telling people about your holdings or setup
  • Don't discuss Bitcoin publicly
  • Don't post about it on social media

Think of this like protecting jewellery, a safe, or important documents. Basic discretion goes a long way.

Client Summary: Calm, Prepared, Protected

The safest Bitcoin is Bitcoin you cannot be forced to move alone.

This remains uncommon for ordinary holders, but the France cases show why serious Bitcoin holders should calmly prepare. Review privacy, signing policy, and your family message regularly.

Quick Reference Checklist

  • Review privacy and public signals. Reduce who knows, and what they know, about your holdings and setup.
  • Control who can reach you. Silence or screen unknown numbers; verify-and-initiate for claimed organisations; never act on Bitcoin requests from an unsolicited contact alone.
  • Keep purchases and payments lean. Authenticity first when buying hardware; do not spend from a long-term vault just to stay private.
  • Confirm signing policy is current. Unusual urgency or distress should trigger verification and refusal.
  • Make sure your family understands the main vault cannot be moved by one person.
  • Do not resist; prioritise safety. Your personal safety comes first.
  • Explain that your Bitcoin cannot be moved with one key. Collaborative security materially reduces what coercion can achieve against the vault.
  • Make clear that TBA and the custody partner must approve a normal vault spend. That is the operational reality. It does not guarantee an attacker will stop.
  • You may hand over your seed or device if it keeps you safe. It cannot move the vault.
  • You may have a small spending wallet separate from vault funds. Optional only; it does not protect core holdings and must not replace collaborative security.
  • TBA may refuse coerced requests under the Duress & Capacity clause. We are trained to recognise coercion. That is an operational control, not a guarantee of physical safety.
  • Once safe, contact TBA to rebuild your vault. We will help you recover and secure everything.

Collaborative security is designed for this scenario. It protects you when you are not in control. Prepare once, then live normally and confidently.

Want to Learn More About Collaborative Security?

Collaborative security is the foundation of physical attack protection. Learn how a client-controlled 2-of-3, with TBA as key agent, removes single points of failure and helps protect your Bitcoin against theft, loss and coercion.

Learn About Collaborative SecurityContact Us

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